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ABSTRACT: This paper reviews the historical background of corporate governance and 
emerging issues in the development and practice of corporate governance in Nigerian and 
South African firms. The paper examines the role of institutional bodies on corporate 
governance of listed firms, regulatory and enforcement, and institutional bodies of corporate 
governance in Nigeria and South Africa. Other issues also examined include role and 
responsibilities of corporate board and external factors that affect corporate governance 
such as politics, corruption, economic, and ownership structure of listed firms. We find that 
institutional shareholders are more active in South Africa than in Nigeria, also shareholders 
association in South Africa are not active compared with that of Nigeria. In addition, South 
Africa have a stronger institutional framework than Nigeria, this really provide an evidence 
to show that enforcement of corporate governance practices in South Africa seem to be better 
than Nigeria. Generally, we find that corruption and bribery, politics, economic and 
ownership structure influence effective corporate governance practice in each country. 
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Since the 1970’s the issue of corporate governance has been the subject of significant debate 
in the US and around the globe. There are reforms of corporate governance in developed and 
developing countries. Efforts to reform corporate governance have been driven in part by the 
needs and desires of shareholders to exercise their rights of corporate ownership and increase 
the value of their shares and wealth. Over the past three decades corporate directors’ duties 
have expanded their traditional legal responsibility of duty of loyalty to corporate 
organisations and shareholders, especially in developed countries. In the mid- 1990s the issue 
of corporate governance in the US and UK received considerable press attention due to the 
wave of corporate governance failure in some firms which led to a wave of institutional 
shareholder activism.  
 
The East Asian financial crisis occurred as a way of ensuring that corporate value would not 
be destroyed traditionally because of the relationship between the CEO and the board of 
directors such as unrestrained issuance of stock option not infrequently.  In 1997 the East 
Asian financial crisis was seriously affected by the exit of foreign capital after the property 
assets collapse. This occurred as a result of lack of corporate governance mechanisms this 
highlighted the weakness of the institution in their economies.  Finally in early 2000s the 
massive collapse of corporations such as Enron and WorldCom made shareholders and 
governments develop an interest in corporate governance. This brought the passage of the 
Sabaness-Oxly Act of 2002(Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, World Bank 2002, OECD 1999).  
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Furthermore, international organisations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) introduced 
principles of corporate governance of firms. The developed and developing countries 
introduced codes of corporate governance to enhance the effectiveness of corporate 
governance practices in firms. Consequently, the impact of corporate governance has shown a 
positive effect on different stakeholders by strengthening the economy. Therefore, good 
corporate governance is a tool for socio-economic development and this happened to 
developed countries such as the US and the UK. 
  
Moreover, the Securities Exchange Commission (2006) explained that in the Africa region 
despite the diversity of the 53 countries with different colonial legacies, some pattern can be 
discerned with regard to corporate governance. As a result, the need for corporate governance 
among the listed, non-listed, and state-owned enterprises cannot be over-emphasised. Thus, it 
is obvious that corporate governance can contribute to the economic success of firms and to 
long-term stability, which in turn will attract local and foreign investors. The Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC, 2006) revealed that a survey conducted by Mckinsey 
consulting group in 2002, found that eight-five per cent of respondents consider corporate 
governance in Sub-Saharan Africa to be more important than financial issues in deciding 
which companies to invest. 
 
 Consequently, this study extends its coverage to listed firms in Nigeria, and South Africa and 
these countries are English speaking countries and their selection is based on regional 
approach, this will give a wider scope.  South Africa which  is the strongest economy in the 
sub-region  and Nigeria a having huge population and large markets, blessed with abundant 
natural resources such crude oil and land fertile  for  agriculture. The regulation, control and 
governance of Business Corporation of these countries are largely contained within provision 
of company legislation which have their root from British colonies which is their source of 
political independence. Based on this, Nigerian and South African legal systems and 
corporate governance mirror the United Kingdom pattern (Okike, 2007). Therefore, it is 
necessary for this study to examine the development corporate of governance structures of 
listed firms for each of these countries in order to highlight different reforms, institution, 
politics, corruption, economic and ownership structure of firms in Nigeria and South Africa.  
 
Historical Background of Corporate Governance in Nigerian and South Africa Firms 
Nigeria is one of the important countries in Sub-Saharan African Anglophone region because 
of his large size, huge population and markets for goods and services with abundant natural 
resources such as crude oil and fertile for  agriculture. There are reforms on corporate 
governance such as Code of Corporate governance best practice in 2003 issued by Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC). In 2006, there was Code of corporate governance for banks 
post consolidation issued by Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and recently Securities 
Exchange Commission issued another Code of corporate governance in 2011. It is obvious 
from the above that there is multiplicity of Code corporate governance in Nigeria. Despite 
these reforms on corporate governance there are corporate failures of firms.   
     
Corporate governance in Nigeria can be traced to the colonial days through the independence 
that Nigeria obtained from Britain in 1960. Before the independent the British colonial 
government imposed an Anglo-Saxon base system of corporate law and regulation on the 
country (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011). The conduct and governance of Nigerian firms 
which contain within the provision of the company legislation was originated from Britain. 
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As a result, Nigeria inherited Anglo-Saxon framework of corporate governance (Okike, 
2007). After independence, the Nigerian government replaced the Companies Ordinance of 
1922 with the 1968 Companies Act which was modelled on the UK Companies Act of 1948. 
This implies all the reforms in law and legal system are fashioned toward the Anglo-Saxon 
model and Nigerian legal operating framework for corporations have not been developed 
based on the country business environment (Adegbite and Nakajima, 2011). Consequently, 
the government of Nigeria have traditionally failed to deal with the problem of company law 
and legal system from the perspective of the socio-political environment of the country 
(Okike, 2007). 
 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC, 2006) in Nigeria revealed that despite all these 
provisions there are corporate failures in financial and non-financial sectors in the country. 
There are indications that banking industry and other firms were collapsing in their numbers, 
leaving a trail of woes for investors, shareholders, suppliers, depositors, employees and other 
stakeholders. This was a result of the messy state of the nation then that led the government 
to make a bold step in initiating the corporate governance evolution. In addition, in order to 
address the problem and to align with international best practices the SEC inaugurated a 
committee on corporate governance in June 2000 and the Code of Best Practices on corporate 
governance in Nigeria was submitted in November 2003. This Code of Corporate 
Governance Practices was based on unitary board structure (as in the UK and USA) with 
emphasis on the identified triple constraints: the role of board of directors and management, 
shareholders rights and privileges, and the audit committee (Aganga 2011).  
 
When apartheid collapsed in 1994, South Africa was able to be part of international 
organisation and other countries started having business relationships with South Africa. As a 
result, there was need for sound corporate governance to be in place. The King Report I on 
corporate governance was published in 1994 and this report has a code based on stakeholder 
approach. In March 2002 there was an update Report which was King II Report on corporate 
governance, the Report consist of new sections such as role and responsibilities of the board 
of directors, risk management, sustainability reporting, accountability and auditing. In March 
2010 King III Report was published, this Report focuses on the move from a complied or 
explained approach to a principle based apply or explained approach.  The   existence of 
better corporate governance practice in South Africa attracts more investors for strong 
economic development in the sub-region.  
 
South Africa was totally isolated from the global economy from1961 to 1994 as a result of 
the political environment (apartheid) the United Nations excluded South Africa from 
involving in international organisations, resulting in economic and trade sanction against 
South Africa (Vaughn and Ryan 2006).  Consequently, this sanction affected the   domestic 
market not have interaction with foreign capital market the corporate practices, laws and 
regulation is does not conformed to international standard. This resulted to a situation where 
most of the South African firms are controlled by incompetent and entrenched managers 
(Vaughn and Ryan 2006). In order to compete in business with the rest of the world at that 
period the corporate governance of firms in South Africa was in need of reform. As a result,  
the Institute of Directors in South Africa lay the foundation of corporate governance in South 
Africa through the setting up  of the first official committee on corporate governance and 
asked  the retired Supreme Court of South Africa Judge M.E King to chair the committee. 
Like the corporate governance Codes of other Commonwealth countries, the King Code of 
corporate governance was tailored toward the principle approach, different from other Codes 
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such as Sarbanes-Oxyle which is based on rule. This idea was supported by South African 
Chambers of Business (SACOB), the Institute of Chattered Secretaries and Administrators 
(ICSA), South Africa Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA) and the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange (JSE) (Rossouws. et.al 2002).  
 
Legal and regulatory frameworks for corporate governance of firms in Nigeria and 
South Africa 
Nigeria has a legal framework derived from British Common Law and similar commercial 
codes. Also apart from the main statute regulating corporate organizations in the country, 
which is the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 1990 (that replaced the Companies 
Act of 1968), there is several corporate governance Codes in force, some of them are industry 
specific. The corporate governance Codes applicable in the country are the Code of Best 
Practices on Corporate Governance in Nigeria 2003 which was issued by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).The Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post-
Consolidation 2006, which was issued by the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the Code of 
Corporate Governance for Insurance Industry in Nigeria 2009, which was issued by the 
National Insurance Commission (NAICOM). The 2003 SEC Code has been reviewed and 
posted to SEC website in 2010. As can be gleaned from the above, there is a multiplicity of 
corporate governance codes in Nigeria (SEC, 2011). In addition in June 2011, the Federal 
Government introduced Financial Reporting Council Act No 6 with the aim to use the 
Council as a vehicle for improving corporate financial reporting practice in Nigeria.  
The corporate governance regulatory institutions in Nigeria such as the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Corporate Affairs 
Commission (CAC) and the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), are staffed with 
self-interested executives who easily and readily collaborate with companies’ senior 
executives to compromise the shareholders’ interests. Board members are picked from the 
pool of high-profiled retired senior military officers and civil servants without expertise in 
basic finance and business operations (Okpara, 2010). In addition, Bakare (2011) argues that 
there is need for an appropriate corporate governance guideline relevant to socio-political, 
economic, and cultural environment of Nigeria and also effective laws, will and commitment 
on the part of the government to enforced compliance of corporate governance policy.    
 
The changed in political and economic in South Africa result to major reformed in corporate 
governance legislation which focused on Companies Act 1973 (Andreasson, 2007).  This 
because the King code of corporate governance I, II, and III for firms in South Africa are not 
enforced through legislation.  However, there are rules and regulation that concern corporate 
governance in South Africa, including the Companies Act (1973 as amended as Companies 
Act 2008), South Africa common law and Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listing 
requirements. Others also include the Labour Relation Act (1995), the Basic Condition of 
Employment Act (1997), the Employment Equity Act (1998), the Insider Trading Act (1998), 
and the Securities Services Act (2004) (Andreasson, 2007).The Securities Services Act 
(2004) aims and objectives are to increase confidence in financial markets in South Africa 
and promote innovation and investment in South Africa market and companies. Other 
objectives include encouraging transparency and high standards of corporate governance, 
promoting regulation and enforcement of corporate governance and reducing systemic risk 
among firms. The Companies Act of 1973, as amended in 2008, explained the regulatory 
relationship between directors, shareholders and firms such as appointment, removal of 
directors and other issues relating to stakeholders of firms (Andreasson, 2007).  
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In addition, Rossouw et.al (2002) revealed that the key actors that regulate companies on 
behalf of the government in South Africa are the Reserve Bank, the Registrar of Banks, the 
Financial Services Board and the Registrar of Companies. The author explained that the main 
function of these regulating bodies is to protect the stakeholders and the public.  Moreover, 
Rossouw et.al (2002) explained that the financial regulatory system in South Africa 
comprises three main components including the regulation of financial instruments, 
regulation of the market in which this instrument is being traded and the regulation of those 
that participated in the market. Furthermore, the author documented that regulation of 
financial institutions is divided between the South Africa Reserve Bank, by Registrar of 
Banks, and Financial Services Board (FSB) 
  
The role of institutions in corporate governance of firms in Nigeria and South Africa 
The subject of corporate governance is relatively new in Nigeria, however the evolution of 
corporate governance for listed firms is as a result of various corporate failures, Also, the 
1999 change in government in Nigeria from prolonged military regime into a new democratic 
administration with a policy to attract new and sustainable foreign investments which 
necessitated the need for corporate governance  reform (Aganga 2011).This results in an 
established commission to review the existence, adequacy and relevance of corporate 
governance in Nigeria relative to the international best practices in response to the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). In view of the importance attached to the institution 
for effective corporate governance the Federal Government of Nigeria, through its various 
agencies, has come up with various institutional arrangements to protect the investors’ hard 
earned investment from unscrupulous management/directors of listed firms in Nigeria 
(Aganga 2011). These institutional arrangements, provided in the Code of Corporate 
Governance Best Practices issued in November 2003.  
 
The main regulators and enforcers of corporate governance are the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Corporate Affairs Commission (which register all incorporated 
companies). The Companies Allied Matter Act 1990, (CAMA) and the Investment Securities 
Act provide basic guidelines on company listing and more detailed regulations are covered in 
the Nigeria Stock Exchange Listing rules. The Banks and other Financial Institution Act 1991 
as subsequently amended, the act empowered the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) to register 
and regulate bank and other financial institution. Also there is the Insurance Act of 2003 for 
regulation of insurance companies through National Insurance Commission (NAICOM). 
Furthermore, other institutions such as Institute of Chartered Accountant of Nigeria (ICAN), 
the Association of Accountant of Nigeria (ANAN), and Institute of Directors (IoD) play 
various roles in promoting effective corporate governance systems in Nigeria. This occurs by 
enlightening their members through conferences, seminars and symposiums on compliance 
with the code of corporate governance practices for listed firms.  
 
In South Africa as a result of the need for sound corporate governance practices due to 
political and economic transition in 1990s, the government of South Africa carried out the 
following reform: forceful market pressure which was brought to bear on the mining finance 
houses; a new role for institutional investors and voluntary compliance with the King Codes 
of corporate governance. The reforms also include stringent rules and requirements by the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) as the self-regulators of the equity market; innovation in 
disclosure and transparency which is to solve conflicts of interest among the stakeholders of 
corporate governance; and the Insider Trading Act (Malherbe and Segal 2001).   
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The King Committee on corporate governance was inaugurated in 1992 and the first King 
Report (King I) on corporate governance was issued in 1994. This report was tailored toward 
the UK Cadbury Report of 1992 (Andreasson, 2007). The King I Report comprises the code 
of corporate practices and conduct and this was the first corporate governance Code of firms 
in South Africa.  The king I Report served as a reference point for policy makers in the 
examination and development of legal and regulatory frameworks for corporate governance 
(Moyo, 2010).The king 1 Report  recommended standards of conduct for boards and directors 
of listed firms such as financial, non-financial and state-owned companies. In addition King 1 
Report suggests that all stakeholders should be involved in corporate governance practices of 
firms. Moreover, the main principles from the king 1 Report on corporate governance 
practice covered the following areas of corporate governance: the composition, role and 
guidance on the category for board of directors (non-executive). The King 1 report also 
covered appointments to the board for executive directors and guidance for maximum terms 
for them, determination and disclosure of directors’ remuneration and meeting of board. 
Other areas include the balance of annual reporting, requirements for effective auditing, and 
codes of business ethics (Moyo, 2010).  
 
The King II report was issued in March 2002; this report consists of new sections on 
sustainability, the role of the corporate board and risk management. Andreasson (2007) 
argues that the publication of King II Report is to show that there is a connection between 
economic and societal goal. This suggests that there is a relationship between economic and 
societal variables in shaping corporate governance reform in South Africa. In March 2010 
King III Report was published, this Report focuses on the move from a complied or explained 
approach to a principle based apply or explained approach.  The   existence of better 
corporate governance practice in South Africa attracts more investors for strong economic 
development in the sub-region (Vaughn and Ryan 2006). The king III Report Code of 
corporate governance was applicable from March 2010 for firms in South Africa although the 
report was published in September 2009. Unlike King Report I and King report II, King 
Report III is applicable to all entities; public, private, and non-profit organisations such as 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO). The King III Report recommended that 
organisations should have an integrated report in place of annual reports and as separate 
sustainability reports in according to the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting 
Guideline (Price Water House Coopers, 2009). Moreover, King III Report introduced, as 
global emerging governance trends, alternative dispute resolution, risk-based internal audit, 
and shareholders’ approval of non-executive directors’ remuneration and evaluation of board 
and director performance (Price Water House Coopers, 2009). In addition, the following are 
the new principles introduced as part of the corporate governance Code in the King III Report 
IT governance, business rescue, and fundamental affected transaction in term of director 
director’s responsibility during mergers and acquisition and amalgamation. There are statutes 
which involve companies and directors that are briefly summarised in the King III Report. 
This includes the Public Finance Management Act and Promotion of Access to Information 
Act (Price Water House Coopers, 2009).  
 
Nevertheless, in order to change the approach of corporate governance in South Africa, King 
III Report moves from a comply or explained approach to a principle-based apply or 
explained approach. This indicates those organisations are expected to explain by disclosing 
how the principles have been applied or have not been applied (Moyo, 2010).  
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Rossouw et.al (2002) explained that the Financial Service Board (FSB) is founded as a 
statutory board by the Financial Services Board Act, 1990. The function of the board is to 
supervise the activities of non-banking financial services. In addition, to act as an adviser to 
the Minister of Finance, the FSB supervises the institutions and services in terms of the 16 
Parliamentary Acts. Moreover, the function of FSB is assisted by the Insider Trading 
Directorate, Advisory Board on Financial Markets, Advisory Committee on Long and Short 
Term Insurance, Pension Fund and Units Trust in South Africa (Rossouw et.al 2002).  The 
authors further explained that the financial services industry finances the FSB, the 
government of South Africa have no contribution toward the board activities and this may 
likely bring a problem between the regulator (FSB) and the market participants that the board 
is regulated 
 
The role of directors in Nigerian South Africa firms 
The means by which a corporation is being controlled is through the power and obligation of 
the board of directors. The Companies Allied Matter (CAMA) 1990 requires every private 
company registered in Nigeria to have at least two directors on the board of the company 
(Okike, 2007). In addition, according the Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance 
issue by SEC on April 1st 2011 explained that director should be involved in the day- to-day 
operations and management of the company, in particularly they should be responsible for the 
department they head and should answer to the Board through the Chief Executive Director 
or Managing Director. Also, directors should not be involved in the determination of their 
remuneration.  Non-Executive directors should be key members of the board; they should 
bring independent judgement as well as necessary scrutiny to the proposals and actions of the 
management, and executive directors such as issues of strategy, performance, evaluation and 
key appointments.   
 
The Code of Best Practice for corporate governance in Nigeria is based on a unitary board 
structure (as in the UK and USA) with emphasis on the identified triple constraints: the role 
of board of directors and management, shareholders rights and privileges, and the audit 
committee (Aganga 2011). Consequently, the boards of directors are the leader and the 
controller of the company. Thus an effective board is fundamental to the success of a 
company (Okike, 2007). The Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance SEC (2011) 
indicates that the board should be a sufficient size relative to the scale complexity of the 
company’s operation and be composed in such a way as to ensure diversity of experience 
without compromising independence, compatibility and integrity. Also, the members should 
always be available to attend meetings of the board, the membership should not be less than 
five, majority of the board members should be non-executive directors and at least one should 
be an independent director. In addition, members of the board should be upright personal 
characteristics, relevant core competent and entrepreneurial spirit, and a good record of 
tangible achievement and knowledgeable in board matters. They should also possess a sense 
of accountability, integrity and be committed to the task of good corporate governance. The 
board should be independent of management so that they can carry out their oversight 
function in an objective and effective manner. 
 
 Moreover, Aganga  (2011) argues that  the board needs a range of skills and understanding to 
be able to deal with various business issues and have the ability to review and challenge 
management performance.  The author also explained that there is a need for the board to be 
sufficient in size and have an appropriate level of commitment to fulfil its responsibilities and 
duties.  
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The Code of Best Practices of Corporate Governance SEC (2011) revealed that the primary 
responsibility of the chairman is to ensure effective operation of the board such that it works 
toward achieving the company’s strategic objectives. The chairman of the company should 
not be involved in day- to-day operations of the company; this should be the primary 
responsibility of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the management team. The Code 
explained further that for all public companies listed with the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) the position of the chairman of the board and Chief Executive Officer 
should be separate and held by a different individual. This is to avoid over-concentration of 
powers in one individual which may likely rob the board of the required checks and balances 
in the discharge of its duties.  In addition, the chairman of board should be a non-executive 
director. 
 
 Furthermore, the Code explained the remuneration committee should consist of only non-
executive directors, this is to ensure that appropriate governance structure is adopted and 
implement by the board. The function of the remuneration committee is to overseen the 
nomination, remuneration, performance management, and succession planning process of the 
board. The SEC Code provides a guidance on remuneration policy and practices, the code 
requires the board  of director to oversee the development of a remuneration policy  and 
ensure that the share option that are adopted as part of executive remuneration are not price at 
a discount except with  authorisation of SEC. In addition, the boards should undertake 
periodic peer reviews of director compensation and remuneration levels. KPMG and the SEC 
Code (2011) revealed that the board should disclose in the annual report, director 
remuneration and share options including fees, allowances, all material benefit and 
compensation paid or provided to directors. 
 
In South Africa, the recommendation of the King Reports is that the board members should 
act as the focal point for custodian of corporate governance of firms in South Africa and in 
the best interest of their firms. Also directors should disclose conflict where it exists and 
perform their duties. The King II and III Report recommended that directors should be well 
inducted and trained in order to be adequately guided in their various companies (Moyo, 
2010). In addition, there should be regularly conduct evaluation of the board by nomination 
committee or board committee and individual directors to assess their effectiveness, 
independence and whether they are working toward the interest of stakeholders of the 
companies. 
 
 The King II and III Reports recommended that the board should comprise of a balance of 
executive and non-executive directors with a majority of non-executive directors and 
preferably be independent.  The King III Report lays emphasises on the minimum number of 
directors on a board; a minimum of two executive directors should be appointed on the board, 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the director responsible for finance (Price Water 
House Coopers, 2009). The King II and III Reports also maintained that there should be 
separation of power between the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and there 
should be a clear division of responsibilities so that no individual has unfettered power or 
authority (Moyo, 2010). In addition, the King III Report explained that there should be an 
audit committee, risk committee, the nomination committee and the remuneration committee 
with supervisory functions over their respective areas. Moreover, the King III Report 
recommended that there should be a non-binding advisory vote which enables shareholders to 
express their views on remuneration policy (Price Water House Coopers, 2009).     
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The role of investors on corporate governance in Nigerian and South African firms 
The government and management of a company require the fashioning out aims, objectives 
and the appropriate strategies for their realization. As a result, shareholders are one of the 
strategic stakeholders that should provide checks and balances on the activities of directors. 
In Nigerian firms, shareholders of listed companies have the duty of monitoring the activities 
of management. The shareholder rights emanated from Companies Allied Matter Act 1990 
which deals with investor protection and creditors and disclosure of information to 
shareholders (Aganga, 2011).  
 
Moreover, Okike (2007) argues that the Nigerian Shareholders Solidarity Association 
(NSSA) was formed in December 1987 because shareholders in Nigeria can no longer trust 
auditors in protecting their interest in the corporate affairs of firms. In addition, the author 
believes the Nigerian Shareholders Solidarity Association was formed as a result of 
dissatisfaction of the investment of listed firms with the performance of direction and 
auditors. The Securities Exchange Commission published a Code for shareholders 
association, the Code specified that the board of listed firms should ensure that they deal 
association with transparency and strict adherence to the Code of the shareholder association. 
The SEC Code (2011) also explained that shareholders of listed firms should play a vital role 
in good corporate governance of firms’ especially institutional investors and other 
shareholders with large holdings. The Code specified that they should seek to influence 
positively the standard of corporate governance of firms in which they invested; they should 
demand compliance with the principles of this Code. Also they should seek explanations 
whenever they observe non-compliance with the code.  In addition, Uche (2009) revealed that 
shareholder activism and Codes are complementary tools with value as an important aspect of 
corporate governance.  The author explained that the development of shareholders activism in 
Nigeria is as a result of changes in regulation, corporate practices, expansion in local 
investment and the establishment of shareholder associations by government institutions.  
 
The aims and objectives of Nigerian Shareholders Solidarity Association (NSSA) is to 
promote the interests of the shareholders of listed companies, liaising with the government 
and Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) on matters of interest to shareholders and especially the 
Nigerian economy. Also, ensuring that there is just and equitable management of listed and 
unlisted companies in Nigeria (Okike 2007). 
 
In South Africa insurance, pension fund and mutual fund firms are many  and such institution 
exist in order to exploit the enormous economies of scale of investment process which  
includes the analysis, selection, and monitoring of investments (Malhere and Segal 2001 
However, the King Committee Report on corporate governance is sceptical as  to the role of 
institutional investors as a  result of  the insider trading problem and suggests that 
institutional investors may be unlikely  to cooperate with one another. In recent times, the 
domestic institutional investors in South Africa have shifted into a new role concerning the 
governance of firms in which they are invested in; the large institutions have changed from a 
controlling interest in their investment to a role in monitoring corporate governance and 
performance of their firms (Malhere and Segal (2001). 
 
Institutions, Corruption and corporate governance in Nigeria and South Africa  
Nigeria has a Judiciary system that is divided into: the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, 
the High Court, the Commercial Court and the Magistrate Court. The corporation and 
statutory entities are regulated and supervised by various institutional bodies. For instance, 
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the registration of private companies is done by Corporate Affairs Commission under the 
Companies and Allied Matter (CAMA) 1990; the listed firms are regulated and supervised by 
Securities and Exchange Commission. The   banking sector and other financial institutions 
are regulated and supervised by Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) which are in charge of 
prosecution of fraudulent and corrupt practices. All of the above institutions are established to 
improve the legal and corporate governance system in the country (SEC 2011).   
 
Furthermore, Nigeria has operated a culture of political patronage where the ruling political 
military elite do not pay attention to public accountability.  Thus, the military and civilian 
regimes institutionalised corruption by creating an atmosphere that they are above the law 
(Bakare 2011, Amaeshi et.al 2006). The military and civilian rulers appointed their cronies as 
board of members’ government agencies and private business organisations. This lead to 
persistent failures of corporations where there is a lack of proper accountability and as a 
result of institutionalised corruption in the country. Fagbadebo (2007) explained that diverse 
views on corruption agree that it is a bad behaviour. Also, corruption is not easy to define and 
it is generally not difficult to recognise when observed. As a result, the author argues that the 
most simple and popular definition for corruption is adopted by  the World Bank which states 
that  corruption is the abuse of public power for private benefit.  
 
Moreover, Gray and Kaufmann (1998) define corruption to include bribery and extortion 
which involved at least two parties and other malfeasances that a public official can carry out 
alone, including fraud and embezzlement. The authors posit that people may assume that only 
politician in government are corrupt, most often bureaucrats provide the template for 
perfected corruption. Most corrupt practice is only exposed by bureaucrats when they are 
excluded in sharing in the process.   
 
In Nigeria, Okike (2007) argues that the various measure taken by government to improve the 
investment climate and corporate governance, meant to help attract foreign investment, are 
commendable with the investment potential in Nigeria. However, the government effort 
cannot yield good results because of corruption in entire sectors in the county. The Global 
Corruption Report produced by Transparency International, ranks Nigeria as the second most 
corrupt country in the world after Bangladesh. ROSC (2004) revealed that corruption is the 
main obstacle to enforcement of standards and this affects the financial reporting when the 
auditors connive with management to defraud companies (Okike, 1996, 2004).  
 
One of the more notable  events  in the  recent history of  corporate bodies is the corruption 
by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and other management of banks which led to the  
collapse  of most Nigerian banks in the mid- 1990s and even recently. Also, there is corrupt 
corporate behaviour in non-financial firms in Nigeria such the scandal of Cadbury Plc and 
Halliburton.  Business Codes of Ethics and Corporate Governance Code of Best Practice play 
an important role in driving transparency and accountability reforms, which can combat 
corruption. In addition, the type and quality of laws and regulations (including level of 
enforcement) of the countries in which the companies operate has a direct bearing to the level 
of corruption in a particular country (Obinatu 2006).  
 
There are legal enforcement mechanisms established by the Federal Government to eradicate 
corruption in Nigeria. This include the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act 1991, the 
Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts) and Financial Malpractices in Banks Act 1994. Others are   
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the Money Laundering Act 1995 and the Money Laundering Act (Prohibition) 2004. In 1999 
the president set up two anti-graft bodies such as Independent Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission 
(EFCC) Act 2004 in order to eradicate corruption. However, as of today corruption has not 
being eradicated in the country. It is still persistent in every sector of the economy (SEC 
2011).   
 
There are three events that are significant in relation to the political and business system in 
the history of South Africa. These include firstly; the Soweto riots of 1976 which pushed the 
white elite from politics and business, these riots indicated the condition under which blacks 
were living in South Africa. Consequently, the riots of 1976 in Soweto really indicate that the 
government had lost confidence in the effectiveness of the  apartheid policy, business and 
political stability in South Africa (Malhere and Segal (2001).Secondly, In the 1970s, there 
was a political struggle organised by  the African Labour Union in  the factories and mines of 
large firms.  However, there were mine riots and strikes by African workers at Durban 
factories in 1973 which ended the era (Malhere and Segal (2001).  
 
Thirdly, in the 1970s there was a sanctions imposed on South Africa by the international 
community and this international isolation was increased in the 1980s. As a result, it affected 
most South African larger firms financially, and such firms have international connection 
examples are Anglo-American firms and South Africa Breweries (Malhere and Segal (2001). 
Moreover, political reforms started in 1986 and Nelson Mandela was released. Finally 
apartheid collapsed in 1994 and since the end of apartheid South Africa has been dominated 
by the African National Congress (ANC). The national government of South Africa is 
composed of three interrelated branches which are the legislature (Parliament) made up of the 
National Assembly and National Council of Province.  In addition, there is the  Executive 
(President) which is the head of state and head of government, the Judiciary which comprises 
the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the High Court. The South 
African government differs from other Commonwealth nations because each government 
level, such as the national, provincial and local have legislative and executive power and 
authority in their own level, and this is explained in the South Africa Constitution as 
distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.  
 
Furthermore, in South Africa the corporation and statutory entities are regulated and 
supervised by various institutional bodies such as Financial Service Board (FSB), the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS), the 
South Africa National Accreditation System (SANAS), the Institute of Chattered Secretaries 
and Administrators (ICSA), the South Africa Institute of Chartered Accountants (SAICA), 
and the South Africa Reserve Bank (Rossouw et al. 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, South Africa has anti-corruption law in place, but still there are cases of 
corruption in both in public and private enterprises. Vaughn and Ryan (2006) posited that 
there are cases of private funding of political parties in South Africa and the sources of such 
funding are undisclosed. As a result, the author suggested that there is need for regulation of 
private funding of political parties. In addition, Moyo (2010) documented that corruption 
leads to poor corporate governance in South Africa because Transparency International in 
2009 positioned South Africa at 55th out of 180 countries that were surveyed. However, in 
2008, an index Ibrahim on African governance such Transparency Human Right and 
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Corruption for Sub-Saharan African countries and South Africa was placed 5th out of 48 
countries survey (Moyo (2010). 
 
Economy, Markets and Investments in Nigeria and South Africa 
 The Nigerian economy has a turbulent history among Africa countries because the Nigeria 
has abundant mineral resources such as crude oil, bitumen and fertile land for Agriculture 
still the economy is growing. Also from 1960 to 1970 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
recorded 3.1 per cent growth annually and during the oil boom period (1970-1978) the GDP 
increased positively by 6.2 per cent annually. However, in the 1980s there were negative 
growth rates of GDP (Ekpo and Umoh 2012).  
 
In addition, from 1988 to 1997 the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and economic 
liberation had an impact on the GDP by increasing the GDP at a positive rate of 4 per cent. 
The economy of Nigeria has not experienced double-digit inflation during the 1960s; 
however in 1976 the inflation rate was at 23 per cent, but decreased to 11.8 per cent in 1979, 
increased to 41 per cent in 1989 and increased again to 72.8 per cent in 1995. However, from 
1996 to 1998 the inflation rates have reduced to 29 per cent (Ekpo and Umoh 2012).  
 
Against this background, it seems that the economy performance was better immediately 
after independence and at the period of the oil boom. Thus, during the 1980s the economy 
was in a recession. Moreover, in 1986 Nigeria embraced the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which influenced the economic policies 
of Nigeria government and led to economy reforms in the late 1980s and mid 1990s in 
monetary and fiscal policies, the removal of oil subsidy and financial market.  Other reforms 
include public sector reform and full or partial privatisation and commercialisation of 
publicly-owned enterprises (Kolapo and Adaramola 2012). In addition, since 1999 when 
there has been stable democratic government up to present day, the federal government has 
carried out various reforms such as in the banking sector, capital market, pension and public 
services. This reforms programme is an attempt to put the economy in a recovery path 
through a reduction in inflation (Ekpo and Umoh 2012). 
 
Furthermore, Nigeria has huge economic potential in the African continent. The country is 
richly endowed with human and natural resources with about 160 million people and with an 
internal market that has no rival within the African continent (Bala 2003). Nigeria is ranked 
as the sixth major producer of oil in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and has numerous solid mineral deposits such as coal, bitumen, gypsum and precious 
stones. Also there are industries such construction, pharmaceuticals, food processing and 
other manufacturing industries. Yet despite the huge resources in the country, Nigeria has not 
been able to achieve a high level of economic growth or been able to attract a high level of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in relation to the level of economic potential that exists in 
Nigeria (Ekpo and Umoh 2012). 
  
There are major factors underpinning the economic growth and Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in Nigeria this includes; over-dependence on the oil sector, which accounts for 95 
percent of foreign currency income and 80 per cent of the national budget. Also, the national 
deficit and foreign debt caused by free-spending, poor implementation of economic policies 
under past military regimes, and corruption. Other factors are unstable regulatory and 
institutional environments and insecurity in the country (Bala 2003). The latter author 
explained that in order to bring Nigerian investment into a more competitive position for 
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foreign direct investment (FDI) and to ensure free transfer and repatriation from Nigeria, the 
Federal government has legislated two laws. These laws are the Nigerian Investment 
Promotion Commission (NIPC) Act 16 and the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and 
Miscellaneous provision) Act 17 which were enacted in 1995. This is to allow foreigner have 
100 per cent ownership of their business and repatriate their capital if they decide.  
 
The Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) is an agency of the Federal 
Government with a statutory mandate to co-ordinate, monitor, encourage and provide 
necessary assistance and guidance for the establishment and operating enterprise in Nigeria. 
The function of the commission is to plan and support measures which can enhance the 
investment climate in the country for both domestic and foreign investors. In addition, the 
commission also promote investment within and outside the country through effective 
promotional means and disseminating current information on incentives available to investors 
(NIPC 2012). 
 
A recent report by Bello (2012) indicate that despite the infrastructural, security and other 
challenges the country foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow into the country increased from 
$1.309 billion in the third of quarter  2011 to $1.574 billion in the last quarter of that year. 
This result suggests that there is still confidence by foreign investors despite the challenges 
the country is facing at present. In addition, Bello (2012) also found that portfolio investment 
reduced from $1.130 billion in third quarter of year 2011 to $1.13 billion during the period, 
this is evidence that Nigerian capital market is responding to the global economic shock. 
   
South Africa was totally isolated from the globally economy from1961 to 1994. As a result of 
the political environment (apartheid),the United Nations excluded South Africa from 
involvement in international organisations, this amounting  to imposing economic and trade 
sanctions against South Africa (Vaughn and Ryan 2006). In 1986 there were political reforms 
which led to the collapse of apartheid in 1994. This led to the lifting of sanctions imposed by 
the international community on South Africa. Thus, market pressure and the global economy, 
South Africa introduced key reform initiatives because of the need for sound corporate 
governance so as to attract foreign investment. Such key initiatives are the King Reports on 
corporate governance, Insider Trading Act and revised listing requirements for the stock 
exchange (Vaughn and Ryan 2006).   
 
Moreover in the 1990s the economy of South Africa was central on mining finance houses. 
As a result the mining industry has been the centre of the South Africa investment output and 
export performance since late 19th and 20th century (Malhere and Segal (2001). The finance 
house was formed in the late 19th and 20th century to exploited Johannesburg gold deposits 
and finances the national gold mining industry and diamond industry pioneered coal and 
platinum industry. All these are sources of funds for the manufacturing based of South Africa 
(Malhere and Segal (2001). In addition, the finance mining house is also like main source for 
development of South African capital and money market. It also has investment in most of 
South Africa’s largest banks. Apart from this, the sources of equity are from strong non-
banking financial institutions such as pension funds, and life insurance companies which 
developed early and were diverted to a large part of household saving equity. Consequently, 
equity plays a central role in new funding of non-financial firms in South Africa (Malhere 
and Segal (2001).  
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Furthermore, since 1994 South African economic performance has been better. It is the 
largest and most developed economy in Africa, with 40 percent of income in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Vaughn and Ryan 2006). However, economic growth remained low with high 
unemployment and many South Africans in poverty in comparing with some emerging or 
developing countries. In order to solve some of the economic challenges in South Africa, 
there was a programme founded after democratic transition in 1994 which was known as   
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). The objective of this programme is for society to 
shift the racial distribution of income, wealth and economic power. As a result, labour, 
licensing procurement and civil services make sure that all their policies are reflected with 
(BEE) objectives (Malhere and Segal (2001). 
 
Ownership Structure of Listed Firms in Nigeria and South Africa  
During the colonial period when the British were ruling the country, Nigerian corporations 
are dominated by foreign owners. As a result, the Federal Government of Nigeria 
promulgated a law in regard to indigenisation of foreign owned enterprises which was the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act 1972 and 1978 as well as the Foreign Exchange Act of 
1962. Thus, prior to that the listing requirements were not attractive for more companies to be 
listed on Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). Consequently, indigenisation allow more 
companies listed on Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) because there were sales of equity 
shares held by foreigners in publicly quoted companies and more Nigerians were able to 
purchase these shares (Okike 2007).  
 
Moreover, Nigerian scholars have expressed their doubt as to whether the Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Act 1972 have any significant effect on corporate governance 
especially  whether there is any effect on ownership structure of the  firms in Nigeria 
(Yerokun, 1992 and Ahunvan, 2002). The latter authors argue that the enactment of Nigerian 
Enterprises Promotion Act 1972 and 1978 as well as the Foreign Exchange Act of 1962 did 
have significant effect on ownership structure of Nigerian firms and corporate governance. 
The main area where ownership was affected was through the provision of 100 per cent 
foreign ownership in various sectors. As a result many foreign firms have to divert their 
shareholding in order to meet the requirement. In the end the Federal Government purchased 
the majority of the diverted shares because there was no sufficient domestic investment fund 
available as that time (Ahunvan 2002). In addition, the remaining of the diverted share that is 
not purchased by federal government was purchase by some few very wealthy Nigerians 
(Akinsanya 1983). 
 
Furthermore, as a result of government’s macroeconomic policy and legislation on foreign 
ownership the Federal Government actively involved in productive activities, owning 
industrial, commercial and services provision in corporation. This involvement can be either 
sole or joint venture with foreign or local investors. In order hand it may be foreign investors 
continue to operate as majority (controlling) partner with government and local investors. 
Also, it may be local investors working either as minority partners with foreign investors or 
through small family firms (Ahunvan 2002). However, in the publicly listed firms in Nigeria 
foreign investors (as minority) may operate with local investors in the industrial and 
commercial sectors, and then there  are some instance where the minority are the government, 
foreign investors, and the majority is the local investors this common in the financial sectors. 
Moreover, the finding of this study will definitely reveal the problem of ownership structure 
in relationship with corporate governance system in Nigeria.  
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In the 1990s most foreign investors come back to the South African capital market; however 
there is resistance from the people as a result of their return. However, with the new political 
climate on ground that initiated the programme Black Economic Empowerment (BEE).  
Emphasising the need for rapid black economic empowerment, this initiative allowed black 
investors group to gain control of listed firms (Malhere and Segal (2001). In August 2000 the 
South African government pronounced a privatisation policy of major state owned enterprises 
(SOEs)  with the aim of assisting poor South Africans and the economic development of 
South Africa (Malhere and Segal 2001). In the mid-1990s the number of firms (excluding 
pyramid holding companies) listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Securities 
Exchange was reduced from 696 to 610. Moreover, one of the requirements for listing on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Securities Exchange is that the companies must have at 
least 500 shareholders and by November 2000 there were 620 companies listed on the JSE 
with a total market capitalization of R1575billion on JSE Securities Exchange (Roussouw 
et.al 2002). 
 
Furthermore, on the issue of control of companies listed on JSE Securities Exchange, 56.2 
per cent of market capitalization of the Securities Exchange as at November 2000 was in the 
control of four companies, namely Anglo American Corporation, Sanlam, South Africa 
Mutual and Rembrandt (Roussouw et.al 2002). The authors argue that as a result of various 
business reasons foreign investors tend to invest by wholly owned private or public 
companies that are not listed on the South African stock market. In addition, black groups in 
South Africa control about 5.6 per cent of the market capitalization as at November 2000. 
This evidence shows that the Black Economic Empowerment programme has failed to 
reached the goal prior to 1998 (Roussouw et.al 2002). The authors also reveal that there is an 
indication from Ernst and Young in 2001 that old the method of attaining control by pyramid 
structures and ‘’N’’ shares are not popular with shareholders and the JSE Securities 
Exchange also prohibited the methods. However, Malhere and Segal (2001) suggest that for 
South Africa to attain a robust market control there is need for more action such as 
strengthened regulation and institutions that monitor taker over, the board members, 
especially independent directors, there is need for them to be trained on their obligation and 
duties on the issue of take-overs.  
 
In sum, South Africa has the largest and most developed economy in Africa, generating about 
forty per cent of the income in Sub-Saharan Africa. As a result, in recent time South African 
firms faces challenges through constitutional and labour legislation with a common 
underlying theme of corporate governance reform that enhance the flow of foreign fund into 
the economy (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006). These corporate governance reforms such as  the 
King I, II, III Reports on corporate governance, Insider Trading Act 1998, Stock Exchange 
Act of 1995, and Companies Act of 1973 (as amended Act 2008). Also South Africa Broad 
Based Black Economy Empowerment (BBBEE) Act 2003 all these reforms and Act 
promulgated for firms is tailored to enhance the growth of the economy of South Africa. In 
addition, there are deep equity cultures in South Africa to the extent that some of the assets of 
non-financial listed firms are funded from the proceeds of equity issues more than half of the 
assets growth in technology, media and communication companies are funded from equity 
issues (Malhere and Segal, 2001). 
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Table 1.1: summary of the  corporate governance institutions, politics, 
corruption,economy and ownership structure  in Nigerian and South African firms 








Legislation is based on  
Companies Allied Matter Act 
(CAMAD) 1990 
There are major reforms of 
corporate governance such 
Code of corporate governance 
by SEC in 2003, CBN 2004 
for banks SEC 2011, and 
establishment of Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) 
 There  are multiple  Code of 
corporate governance best 
practices 
 
Legislation is based on Companies 
Act 1973 
There are major reforms such as 
King Report I, II, and III Code of 
corporate governance.  
There is Reform of JSE and Insider 











Commission (SEC), Nigeria 
Stock Exchange (NSE), 
Corporate Affair Commission 
(CAC),  Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN), National 
Insurance Commission 
(NAICOM), Financial 
Reporting Council (FRC) 
Institute of Directors IoD), 
Association of Corporate 
Governance, Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of 
Nigeria (ICAN), Association 
of Shareholder of Nigeria 
(ASN)   
Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE), Financial Services Board 
(FSB), South Africa Reserve Bank   
Institute of Directors (IoD), South 
Africa Institute of Chartered 
Accountants (SAIC),  South Africa 
Institute  of Chartered Secretaries  
 The same as it explain in Code The same as it explain in King I. II 
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  Code or Guideline  
of Corporate 
governance on  
regulatory 
framework 
of best practices issued by 
SEC  
and  III Report Code of corporate 
governance 
Enforcement  of 
Corporate 
governance  
Weaker enforcement due to 
absent of strong 
instructional/agencies bodies  
More enforcement due to stronger 
instructional bodies/agencies  
Ownership 
structure 
Ownership is concentrated  Ownership is concentrated  
 
Number of Listed 
firms  in Stock 
Exchange  
 
Many firms (206) 
 
Many firms (620) 
 Code or guideline 
on  board structure, 
management and 
role of the board of 
directors 
 
The same with other countries 
 
The same with other countries 
 Code or Guideline 
of corporate 
governance  on  role 
of auditors and 
audit committees 
The same with other countries The same with other countries 
Code or Guideline 
on corporate 
governance on 
remuneration of the 
directors  




There are institutional 
investors  





      Yes  
  




Previously military rule, for 
the past one decade stable 
democratic rule 
There is corruption 
Previously apartheid for the past 
two decades stable democratic ruler   
There is corruption 
Economy, markets 
and investments 
Largest  market because of 
population, abundant natural 
resources such as oil and 
agriculture  
Strongest economy and capital 
market in the  sub-region, depend on 




In terms of board structure, Nigeria and South Africa are using a unitary type of board 
structure. South Africa board structure is in King I, II and III Reports that contain the Code of 
corporate governance. While in Nigeria the structure of the board are embedded in the Codes 
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of best practice of corporate governance.  The Codes are issued by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC); it has the same contents on the structure, role and responsibility of the 
board of directors. The companies’ law and legal system are the same because Nigeria and 
South Africa originated their common law in British common law. 
 
 Furthermore, corruption is common in developing countries and as a result, Sub-Saharan 
Africa Anglophone countries such as Nigeria and South Africa cannot be excluded from 
corruption.  This study revealed that one of the contributing factors that make corporate 
governance of firms in South Africa not to meet with international standard is as a result of 
corruption. Also for South African corporate governance to meet the international standard 
there is need for the government to deal with their local challenges  such as  financial crime, 
fraud within the private and public sector, and money laundering. In addition, socio-political 
corruption has been an obstacle to economic development in Nigeria because corruption is 
being institutionalised and Nigeria is ranked high in the global corruption index.  
 
We find that in Nigerian and South African firms there are institutional shareholders, 
however they are stronger in South African firms than Nigerian firms.  Also shareholders 
association in South Africa are not active compared with that of Nigeria. In addition, South 
Africa have a stronger institutional framework of corporate governance  than Nigeria, this 
really provide an evidence to show that corporate governance practices in South Africa seems 
to be better than  Nigeria. Generally, we find that corruption and bribery, politics, economic 
and ownership structure influence effective corporate governance practices in each country.                                                                                                                
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